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Locality v. Online Travel Company: Does the Bell
Finally Toll for Quill Corporation v. North Dakota?

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, numerous lawsuits have arisen between localities and Online
Travel Companies (“OTCs”) with regard to the payment of local “occupancy taxes.”
Many localities impose occupancy tax on all hotel rooms rented within their
borders, taxes that owner or operator of the hotel is responsible for collecting and
remitting to the locality.1 The tax is usually calculated as a percentage of the retail
price a customer pays for a room.2 Hotels thus charge their customers this retail rate
plus the amount of the tax.3
This system of occupancy tax collection becomes more complex with the
insertion of a third party into the booking process.4 Travel agencies, whether online
or “brick-and-mortar” establishments, most commonly accept payment for the
room directly from the consumer at a marked-up rate, then remit payment to the
hotel consisting of the hotel’s wholesale rate plus an additional amount for taxes.5
This raises a question regarding the calculation of the tax – should it be calculated
based on the wholesale rate the hotel charges for the room, or the marked-up rate
that the consumer actually pays?
This question has given rise to much litigation between localities and OTCs.6 At
issue initially were two main questions: (1) are OTCs responsible for this tax, and
(2) if so, how is the tax calculated?7 The answers to these issues generally boiled
down to statutory interpretation of the relevant ordinances, with an examination of
the relevant enabling statute being the focus of each dispute.8 Naturally, different
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1. See infra Part II.a.
2. See infra Part II.a.
3. See infra Part II.a.
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8. See infra Part II.d.
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cases were decided differently based on the variations in local statutory language
and judicial interpretation thereof.9
As a result, many localities amended their enabling statutes to explicitly hold
OTCs responsible for collecting and remitting occupancy taxes based on the retail
rate of the rooms rented.10 This set the stage for the next round of OTC litigation, in
which the constitutionality of the imposition of the tax upon OTCs became the
primary issue.11 Perhaps the most in-depth discussion of this issue comes from
Baltimore v. Priceline,12 in which the City of Baltimore brought suit against
numerous OTCs to recover underpaid occupancy taxes based on the City’s
amended enabling statute.13 The OTCs, now clearly identified in the statutes as
being responsible for the tax, responded by arguing that the imposition of such a
tax upon them is unconstitutional.14 Specifically, the OTCs argued that the statute
violates the dormant commerce clause based on the physical presence requirement
of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,15 and fails the Supreme Court’s test for the
constitutionality of a state tax on an out-of-state entity set forth in Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady.16
Underlying this dispute is an apparent trend toward the imposition of state sales
and use taxes on internet sales by out-of-state entities.17 As Amazon seems to be
accepting, or even supporting, the imposition of such taxes upon its sales, it seems
probable that state taxes on internet sales will be a reality in the near future.18 This
would, however, require the abrogation of the physical presence requirement of
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, either by Congressional legislation or the Supreme
Court overruling itself.19
Part II of this comment will give an overview of OTC litigation. Part III will
explore Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of state taxes on
out-of-state entities. Part IV will use Baltimore v. Priceline as a framework for
exploring the constitutional arguments against states imposing sales and use taxes
on OTCs. Finally, Part V will discuss the potential abrogation of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Quill Corp. and the potentially enormous impact of the
“Amazon Tax” on OTCs and on e-commerce generally.

9. See infra Part II.d.
10. See infra Part II.e.
11. See infra Parts II.f, IV.
12. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Priceline.com Inc., No. MJG-08-3319, 2012 WL 3043062 (D. Md. July
24, 2012) (Garbis, J.) [hereinafter Garbis Order].
13. Id. at *1; see also infra Part IV.
14. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *2.
15. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). See infra Part III.b.
16. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See infra Part III.a.
17. See infra Part V.b.
18. See infra Part V.b.
19. See infra Parts III.b, V.a.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OTC LITIGATION
a. Occupancy Taxes
Many states and localities collect “occupancy taxes,” which are taxes imposed upon
guests of rented rooms within the borders of the state or locality.20 Generally, these
taxes are calculated based on the rate the guest pays for the room.21 However,
different localities’ statutes differ in language and thus also in judicial
interpretation.
In Kentucky, for example, the state statute governing the tax specifies that it
applies to “the rent for every occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms, charged by all
persons, companies, corporations, or other like or similar persons, groups or
organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like or similar
accommodations businesses.”22 In Georgia, the state’s enabling statute creates an
excise tax “at the applicable rate on the lodging charges actually collected.”23 A city
ordinance from Columbus, Georgia specifies that the tax be based on the “‘charge
to the public’ for a hotel room.”24
However, many of these taxes have been on localities’ books for decades and
thus were drafted before the internet became a primary avenue for booking hotel
rooms.25 As such, they were not originally intended to address online reservations
and rentals.26
b. Travel Agency Business Models
Travel agencies traditionally operate under one of two business models. Under the
“agency model,” an agent refers the guest to the hotel and receives a commission
based on the cost of the rental as set by the hotel.27 Under the more commonly
employed “merchant model,” an agent rents unused hotel rooms directly to the
guest at a marked-up rate, remitting a lower wholesale rate for the room back to the
hotel.28

20. This tax is also referred to as “bed tax,” “transient occupancy tax,” or “tourism development tax” in
different localities. See Kerra J. Melvin, Comment, Technology, Travel Companies & Taxation: Should Expedia Be
Required to Collect and Remit State Occupancy Taxes on Profits from Facilitating Hotel Room Rentals?, 8 WASH.
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 43, 46 n.2 (2012).
21. Id. at 46.
22. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91A.390(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 48–13–51(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2013).
24. Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 681 S.E.2d 122, 128 (Ga. 2009) (citing Columbus Code § 19–111).
25. See Melvin, supra note 20, at 47.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Under the merchant model, the transaction between the OTC and the customer
is typically broken into three items: (1) the room rental rate as marked up by the
OTC, (2) “taxes and services” (including local occupancy taxes), and (3) the total
cost as determined by adding the rental rate, taxes, and service fees.29 Thus, a typical
transaction could look like this: a hotel offers unused rooms to OTCs for $100 per
room. The OTC rents those rooms to consumers, charging $200 for the room and
$20 for “taxes and fees,” including local occupancy taxes. The OTC then remits
$108 to the hotel—$100 for the room, and $8 for taxes calculated based on the $100
that the hotel received for the rental. Initially, then, the OTCs paid the occupancy
tax based on the wholesale rate rather than the marked up rate they received from
customers.30
c. Issue Recognized
In the mid-2000s, localities began to realize that the tax implications of the two
models differ.31 Under the agency model, the agent is not responsible for any
occupancy tax because the guest pays the hotel directly for the room.32 Under the
merchant model, though, because occupancy taxes are calculated based on the total
amount paid by the hotel guest for the room,33 the fact that the agent receives the
total amount of rent but remits only a portion of it to the hotel seems to put the
agent on the hook for the payment of the tax on the amount retained by the agent.34
Localities certainly thought so and started bringing lawsuits against OTCs to
compel payment of the tax.
d. Early Litigation – Do Occupancy Tax Statutes Implicate OTCs?
These first occupancy tax cases boiled down to issues of statutory interpretation,
yielding disparate outcomes based on different statutory language and judicial
interpretation thereof. In Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus,35 the Georgia Supreme
Court rendered an opinion which included an extended analysis of the Columbus
occupancy tax.36 The language at issue in that case was “lodging charges actually

29. See, e.g., Vill. of Rosemont, Ill. v. Priceline.com, Inc., No. 09 C 4438, 2011 WL 4913262, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 14, 2011).
30. Id.
31. The first case involving OTCs and state taxes to generate a judicial order seems to be City of Rome, Ga.
v. Hotels.com, LP, No. 4:05–CV–249–HLM, 2006 WL 6595753 (N.D. Ga., May 9, 2006).
32. See, e.g., City of Goodlettsville, Tenn. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 982, 985 (M.D. Tenn.
2009) (noting that, under the agency model, the hotel “sets the price of the room and is the merchant of record
for the transaction, and the consumer pays the hotel directly”).
33. That is, the room rate exclusive of sales taxes. See, e.g., Vill. of Rosemont, 2011 WL 4913262, at *1.
34. See Melvin, supra note 20, at 48.
35. 681 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2009).
36. Id. at 127–28.
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collected” and “charge to the public,”37 both of which the court interpreted as
applying to the payment collected by OTCs.38 The court thus affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that the taxable amount be based on the rate the OTCs charged
each customer for the room.39
In contrast, the primary issue in Louisville/Jefferson County v. Hotels.com40 was
whether OTCs were encompassed by the phrase “like or similar accommodations
businesses” in Kentucky’s occupancy tax Enabling Statute.41 The Sixth Circuit did
not include travel agencies, either online or “brick-and-mortar,” among these “like
or similar accommodations businesses”42 and thus did not subject OTCs to the tax.43
The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its interpretation of “like or similar accommodations
businesses” in City of Columbus v. Hotels.com in 2012.44
e. Statutes Amended
Correctly anticipating likely defeat based on its original statutory language,
Baltimore amended its occupancy tax ordinance in 2007.45 The amended ordinance
taxes “all gross amounts of money paid to the owners or operators of hotels in the
City by transient guests or tenants for renting, using, or occupying a room or rooms
in those hotels for sleeping accommodations.”46 “Owners or operators” are defined
to include persons “receiving any consideration for the rental of a hotel room for
sleeping accommodations, including, without limitation, any broker, service
provider, or other intermediary: (i) with which a hotel has contracted to arrange for
the rental of a hotel room for sleeping accommodations.”47 The District Court for
37. Id.
38. Id. at 128.
39. Id.
40. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2009).
41. Id. at 384–88; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91.A.390(1) (2008) (“The local governing body or bodies shall
include the commission in the annual budget and shall provide funds for the operation of the commission by
imposing a transient room tax, not to exceed three percent (3%) of the rent for every occupancy of a suite,
room, or rooms, charged by all persons, companies, corporations, or other like or similar persons, groups, or
organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, or like or similar accommodations businesses.”
(emphasis added)).
42. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty., 590 F.3d. at 387–88; see also Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 313
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that OTCs were not implicated by a North Carolina county ordinance requiring that
hotels and “similar type businesses” collect and remit occupancy taxes).
43. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty., 590 F.3d at 390 (affirming district court’s judgment conclusion that OTCs are
not “like or similar accommodations businesses” within the meaning of Kentucky’s enabling statute).
44. City of Columbus, Ohio v. Hotels.com, L.P., 693 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2012).
45. See Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *9 (noting that the previous version of Baltimore’s occupancy tax
did not apply to OTCs).
46. BALT. CITY CODE art. 28 § 21-2 (2012) (emphasis added). “Gross amounts of money” are defined as
“the total gross payments of any kind . . . received in a retail transaction for which real property is rented . . .
without any deduction for charges or other amounts of any services necessary to complete the transaction.” Id.
§ 21-1(b).
47. Id. § 21-1(d)(3).
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the District of Maryland subsequently interpreted this broad language from the
amended statute as subjecting OTCs to the tax.48
f. Recent Litigation – Legality of Statutes Challenged
However, a judicial interpretation stating that the tax applies to monies collected by
OTCs is by no means the end of the story. In Baltimore v. Priceline, for example, the
defendant OTCs raised numerous defenses to liability under the amended statute,
including that the statute violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.49 In denying the
OTCs’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court focused in great detail on
the Commerce Clause arguments in the most in-depth examination to date of these
issues with regard to OTC Occupancy Tax litigation.50 Indeed, the success or failure
of these constitutional arguments is likely to determine the future of OTC
occupancy tax litigation, unless Congress enacts one of the proposed statutes
authorizing state taxation of out-of-state internet commerce.51

III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT — THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE
REQUIREMENT
The constitutionality of a state tax on an out-of-state entity has long been a thorny
issue. The primary question—whether physical presence within a state is required
in order for a state tax on an out-of-state entity to be constitutional—has been at
the heart of three pivotal Supreme Court cases: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue of Illinois,52 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,53 and Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.54
a. Bellas Hess & Complete Auto
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Illinois,55 the Supreme Court
established a bright-line rule in holding that the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses prohibit taxation of a retailer “whose only connection with customers in

48. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *1.
49. Id. at *2. The statute was also challenged on the grounds that it violates the Due Process Clause, and
Equal Protection Clause, and the Internet Tax Freedom Act, as well as that the tax is an “impermissible new
sales tax” prohibited by the Maryland Tax Code. Id.
50. Id. at *2–7; see infra Part IV.
51. See infra Part V.a.
52. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
53. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
54. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
55. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753.
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the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.”56 Thus, the Court
reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that National Bellas Hess Inc., a
Missouri corporation whose only connection to Illinois was that it mailed
merchandise to customers there, was subject to Illinois state use tax on the
merchandise it sold for use in Illinois.57
The Court explained that the inquiries under the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause into the constitutionality of a state use tax were similar, in that
both required some minimum level of connection between the party being taxed
and the taxing locality.58 In order for the tax to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the
taxing locality must have “given [the retailer] anything for which it can ask in
return;”59 to satisfy the Commerce Clause, the tax must be designed to compensate
the locality for the protection it gives to the retailer.60 The Court held that neither
applied to the relationship between Illinois and National Bellas Hess and, therefore,
Bellas Hess was not subject to the state’s use tax.61
A decade later, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court revisited the
issue of taxation of an out-of-state entity and established a test for the
constitutionality of such taxes.62 Unlike in Bellas Hess, where the Court focused
partially on Due Process, the Complete Auto test focuses exclusively on the
Commerce Clause.63 Under the Complete Auto test, a state or local tax imposed on
an out-of-state entity is constitutional under the Commerce Clause only if it (1) is
“applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing State,” (2) “is fairly
apportioned,” (3) “does not discriminate against interstate commerce,” and (4) “is
fairly related to the services provided by the State.”64
The most significant element of the Complete Auto test, relative to the Court’s
holding in Bellas Hess, is that a state tax on an out-of-state entity may be
constitutional where a taxed entity has a “substantial nexus” to the taxing state,
even if that entity has no physical presence within the state.65 This has clear
relevance for the OTC litigation because, while OTCs rarely if ever have a physical

56. Id. at 758; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
57. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754, 760.
58. Id. at 756.
59. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
60. Id. In the Court’s language, the tax “can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a
fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
61. Id. at 758–60.
62. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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presence in the taxing locality, they may still be deemed to be subject to the tax
based on other factors.66
b. Quill Corp.
In 1992, the Supreme Court considered the case of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.67 In
that case, the question was whether North Dakota could impose a use tax upon an
office equipment supplier with no significant property in or relation to the state
beyond sales to its residents.68 Quill, a Delaware corporation, sold office equipment
and supplies and solicited business largely by mailing catalogs, flyers, and other
advertisements to customers.69 It delivered its merchandise to customers “by mail or
common carrier” from locations outside of North Dakota.70
North Dakota imposed use tax on “property purchased for storage, use, or
consumption within the state” from any retailer that “engages in regular or
systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”71 It brought suit,
seeking a declaration that Quill was subject to the state’s use tax despite its lack of
physical presence within the state.72
The trial court ruled for Quill, citing Bellas Hess for the proposition that the lack
of any physical presence rendered a state tax unconstitutional under the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses.73 The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed,
citing Complete Auto and the lower threshold of “substantial nexus”—as opposed to
“physical presence”—required for a state tax to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause.74 This left the Supreme Court to try to reconcile the apparent
inconsistency between its two earlier holdings.
While distancing itself from the Bellas Hess bright-line rule with regard to the
Due Process Clause,75 the Court explained that Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with
Complete Auto with regard to the Commerce Clause.76 Instead, “Bellas Hess . . .
stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State

66. See infra Part IV.a (discussing courts’ interpretations of “substantial nexus”).
67. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
68. Id. at 301.
69. Id. at 302.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 302–03.
72. Id. at 301.
73. Id. at 303.
74. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 219 (N.D. 1991), rev’d 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
75. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307–08 (acknowledging that the Court’s Due Process jurisprudence had
“evolved substantially” since Bellas Hess, overruling the “formalistic” physical presence requirement under the
Due Process Clause, and explaining that the substantial nexus inquiry with regard to Due Process more
properly mirrors the minimum contacts test for in personam jurisdiction from International Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
76. Id. at 311.
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are by mail or common carrier lacks the ‘substantial nexus’ required by the
Commerce Clause.”77 The Court went on to reverse the North Dakota high court,
explaining:
The State of North Dakota relies less on Complete Auto and more on
the evolution of our due process jurisprudence. The State contends
that the nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses are equivalent and that if, as we concluded above,
a mail-order house that lacks a physical presence in the taxing State
nonetheless satisfies the due process “minimum contacts” test, then
that corporation also meets the Commerce Clause “substantial nexus”
test. We disagree.78
Ultimately, the Court concluded that, while physical presence is no longer
required for a finding of substantial nexus under the Due Process clause, it is
required for a finding of substantial nexus—and thus constitutionality of state sales
& use taxes—under the Commerce Clause.79 The Court also indicated that the
question of whether out-of-state retailers with no physical presence in a state should
be subject to that state’s sales and use taxes is a matter better decided by Congress.80

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN

BALTIMORE v. PRICELINE.COM
In Baltimore v. Priceline.com, the City of Baltimore brought suit against numerous
OTCs to recover underpaid occupancy taxes.81 The Defendant OTCs moved for

77. Id.
78. Id. at 312. In this passage, the Court acknowledged that it had adopted a “minimum contacts” test with
regard to Due Process in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, which is much more lenient than the “physical
presence” requirement for Due Process outlined in Bellas Hess. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill.,
386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). The “minimum contacts” test is even a lower threshold than the “substantial nexus”
test. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313 (“[T]he ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like due process’ ‘minimum
contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.
Accordingly, . . . a corporation may have the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing State as required by the Due
Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial nexus” with that State as required by the Commerce Clause.”). As
such, a tax on an out-of-state entity may satisfy due process but still be unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.
79. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 314 (“The State Supreme Court reviewed our recent Commerce Clause
decisions and concluded that those rulings signaled a ‘retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent
physical presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach’ and thus supported its decision not to
apply Bellas Hess. Although we agree with the state court’s assessment of the evolution of our cases, we do not
share its conclusion that this evolution indicates that the Commerce Clause ruling of Bellas Hess is no longer
good law. . . . Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physicalpresence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation
of the Bellas Hess rule.” (internal citations omitted)).
80. Id. at 318; see infra Part V.a.
81. See Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *1.
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summary judgment, arguing that Baltimore’s occupancy tax violated the dormant
aspect of the Commerce Clause,82 which “denies the States the power unjustifiably
to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”83 To
support this contention, the OTCs argued that the ordinance failed the Complete
Auto test84 for constitutionality of a state or local tax on an out-of-state entity.85
In Baltimore v. Priceline, the OTCs unsuccessfully argued that Baltimore’s
occupancy tax ordinance failed each of the four prongs of the Complete Auto test.86
The court’s discussion of these arguments is highly instructive and provides a
framework for examining the constitutionality of imposing local occupancy taxes
on out-of-state OTCs.
a. Substantial Nexus
The definition of “substantial nexus” has remained elusive.87 Even after the Supreme
Court upheld the Bellas Hess88 bright-line rule requiring physical presence for a
finding of substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause in Quill Corp.,89 lower
courts have differed over the meaning of that requirement.90
In perhaps the most lenient interpretation of “substantial nexus,” the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the mere presence of a
VoIP91 customer’s Maryland billing address was sufficient to create a substantial
nexus between the VoIP company and the state of Maryland.92 The South Carolina
Supreme Court found a substantial nexus on the basis of a trademark (“Toys R
Us”) being licensed for use in South Carolina, even where the corporation owning
the trademark has no physical presence in that state.93 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that a bank’s “significant economic presence,” as
determined by the number and value of transactions with state citizens, was
sufficient to satisfy the substantial nexus prong.94 However, the Tennessee Court of

82. Id. at *2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
84. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
85. See Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *2.
86. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *3; see also Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279; supra Part III.a.
87. See, e.g., Julie Roman Lackner, Note, The Evolution and Future of Substantial Nexus in State Taxation of
Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2007).
88. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
89. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
90. Compare, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Vonage Am., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538–39 (D. Md.
2008) (not requiring physical presence) with J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 842 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999) (requiring physical presence).
91. VOIP stands for “Voice Over Internet Protocol,” a method of telecommunication involving the
transfer of data over the internet rather than via telephone wires.
92. Vonage, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 538–39.
93. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 447 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
94. Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E. 2d 226, 234 (W. Va. 2006).
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Appeals held that a lack of physical presence necessarily precludes a finding of
substantial nexus.95
Given the Quill Corp. Court’s holding that “a vendor whose only contacts with
the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the ‘substantial nexus’ required
by the Commerce Clause,”96 only the Tennessee court would seem to have this right.
Certainly, Baltimore v. Vonage seems wrongly decided on this issue given that the
court did not address the physical presence requirement and instead cited Quill
Corp. only for the proposition that the “‘substantial nexus’ requirement is ‘a means
for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.’”97 In Geoffrey, however, the
South Carolina Supreme Court noted that Quill Corp.’s physical presence
requirement applies only to the constitutionality of sales and use taxes and not to
other types of taxes, such as income taxes on royalties resulting from a licensing
agreement.98 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia relied on the same
logic in MBNA America Bank, concluding that the physical presence requirement
does not apply to business franchise and corporate net income taxes.99
In Baltimore v. Priceline, the challenged occupancy tax was a sales and use tax,
though, and thus without a physical presence, the OTCs would lack the substantial
nexus to the taxing state. However, the defendant OTCs “made the strategic
decision” not to argue that their business lacked a substantial nexus to Baltimore
City.”100 Instead, the defendants argued that Complete Auto established a
“transactional nexus” requirement and contended that two separate transactions
take place when a customer books a room through their site.101 First, “monies [are]
paid by consumers (via the OTCs) to the hotels for the use of the hotel rooms;”
next, “monies [are] paid by consumers to the OTCs for the provision of the OTC’s
[sic] travel facilitation services.”102 The argument is that, while occupancy taxes are
paid on the first portion, the portion of the transaction relating to the OTCs’
services lack a substantial nexus to the taxing locality because the OTCs’ offices, call
centers, and servers are located outside of Baltimore.103 The District Court rejected
95. J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 842 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that “the
Commissioner has pointed to no case in which the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a state tax
where the out-of-state taxpayer had absolutely no presence in the taxing state”). But see Am. Online, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. M2001-00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751434, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002) (interpreting
Supreme Court precedent as mandating a finding of no substantial nexus “where no activities had been carried
on in the taxing state on the taxpayer’s behalf”).
96. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 299 (1992).
97. Vonage, 569 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313).
98. Geoffrey, 447 S.E.2d at 18 & n.4.
99. MNBA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 232.
100. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *3–4. The reasons behind the defendants’ decision to forego a what
appears to be a winning argument are not clear.
101. Id. at *3. The OTCs, as the court noted, cited no authority for the purported “transactional nexus”
requirement. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *4.
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this argument, noting that the consumer sends one payment to the OTCs and, even
if it were properly split into two payments as the OTCs suggest, the travel
facilitation services do have a substantial nexus to Baltimore because these services
facilitate travel for the taxpayer to a hotel located in Baltimore.104
Unlike the defendants in Baltimore v. Priceline, most OTC defendants have not
abandoned the argument that there is no substantial nexus between them and the
taxing locality. Yet, despite the bright-line physical presence rule affirmed in Quill
Corp., trial courts have found a substantial nexus between OTCs and the taxing
localities even where physical presence is lacking.105 In diverging from the holding in
Quill Corp., courts have focused on the fact that occupancy taxes are levied on the
hotel customers rather than on the OTCs themselves. In Village of Rosemont v.
Priceline.com,106 the court put it thus:
First, the tax is levied for the privilege and use of renting a hotel room
in Rosemont. The tax is paid by the rentor, who uses the room,
regardless of where or how he made the reservation. Second,
defendants enter into contracts with hotels in Rosemont for the right
to market, facilitate and book reservations for their properties, and
they profit from such reservations. The fact that the customer pays for
the hotel room online, as opposed to in person at the hotel, is not of
constitutional significance, given the nature of the in-state activity
involved, i.e., the fact that the consumer stays in a hotel in Rosemont,
the majority of the money for the hotel stay is remitted to Rosemont
and the purpose of defendants’ online transaction is to have the right
to use property in Rosemont. Although the hotels are not defendants’
regular employees or agents, the services provided by the hotels are
significantly associated with the defendants’ ability to establish and
maintain a market in the taxing state.107

104. Id.
105. See, e.g., City of Charleston, S.C. v. Hotels.com, LP, 586 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (D.S.C. 2008) (“Here,
there is both a substantial nexus and a physical presence between the taxing jurisdictions and Defendants, since
Defendants are alleged to have proactively marketed, booked, and leased hotel rooms and other
accommodations which are physically located in Charleston and Mt. Pleasant.”); City of San Antonio v.
Hotels.com, No. SA-06-CA-381-OG, 2008 WL 2486043, at *14 (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2008) (concluding that
Defendants’ substantial nexus argument is a “red herring” because, by remitting state tax on the wholesale rate
(even if not on the retail rate at OTCs sell to customers), OTCs acknowledge that they are subject to that tax);
Travelscape, LLC v. S. C. Dep’t of Revenue, 705 S.E.2d 28, 37 (S.C. 2011) (substantial nexus requirement
satisfied where Defendants’ employees made business visits to state, entered into contracts with state hotels,
customer actually stays at hotel within the state, and “the services provided by the hotels are significantly
associated with [the Defendant’s] ability to establish and maintain a market in South Carolina for its sales”).
106. No. 09-C-4438, 2011 WL 4913262 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2011).
107. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In effect, this argument focuses on the fact that the activity being taxed in these
ordinances is “the payment of money by transient guests for renting a hotel room,
inclusive of charges for services necessary to complete the rental transaction.”108
There is little question that the “hotel guest . . . has a substantial nexus to the City
because she travels to the City and occupies a room in the City.”109 As such, the
argument goes, the taxable event—the occupation and use of a hotel room by a
guest—occurs within municipal boundaries, negating any argument of a lack of
substantial nexus between the activity being taxed and the taxing locality. Indeed,
“but for the fact that [OTCs have] willingly inserted [themselves] as a matter of
contract into the local taxation scheme designed for hotels and their guests, there
would be no dispute.”110
However, the fact that the tax is levied on the hotel guests fails to distinguish
these cases from Quill Corp. In Quill Corp., the question was whether a use tax
could be imposed by North Dakota upon an office equipment supplier with no
significant property or relation to the state beyond sales to its residents.111 Like with
the occupancy taxes, the use tax in Quill Corp. was to be remitted to the state by
Quill, but it was levied—at least theoretically112 —on those of its customers who use
the merchandise in North Dakota.113 This situation seems entirely analogous to the
present OTC lawsuits because, in both cases, the customers incur the tax but the
merchant is responsible for remitting it to the state.114 In Quill Corp., though, the
Supreme Court held that the out-of-state defendant was exempt from the local
tax.115 In recent OTC litigation, out-of-state travel companies are being held
responsible for local occupancy taxes.116
It remains to be seen exactly how the tension between the recent OTC decisions
and Quill Corp. will be resolved. However, as the Internet continues to challenge
traditional notions of physical boundaries, and as the volume of online sales
continues to take a bigger and bigger bite out of taxable sales by brick-and-mortar
establishments,117 the holding of Quill Corp. seems ever more in need of

108. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *5 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 681 S.E.2d 122, 128 (2009).
111. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
112. Presumably, in the eyes of North Dakota, it would be irrelevant whether the corporation remitted tax
payments it collected from its customers or simply paid the tax out of its own pocket.
113. See id. at 303 (explaining that Quill Corp.’s unwillingness to “collect a use tax from its North Dakota
customers” made it liable for the tax in the eyes of the state’s Tax Commissioner).
114. See supra Part II.a.
115. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 319.
116. See supra notes 105–110 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Betsy Morris, More Consumers Prefer Online Shopping, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013, 10:27 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324063304578523112193480212 (noting that online
shopping “continues to outpace growth in traditional retail” and that, in the United States, e-commerce grew by
15% in 2012, a rate seven times faster than that of total retail spending).
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reevaluation. OTC litigation may provide the Supreme Court with a chance to do
just that, although it seems more likely that the Court will continue to defer to
Congress with regard to taxation of e-commerce.118
b. Fair Apportionment
The second argument against the constitutionality of Baltimore’s occupancy tax
raised by the OTCs in Baltimore v. Priceline is that it fails the fair apportionment
prong of the Complete Auto test.119 This prong aims “to ensure that each State taxes
only its fair share of an interstate transaction.”120
To succeed in claiming a lack of fair apportionment, the taxpayer must prove
that the tax imposed is disproportionate to the business transacted in the taxing
locality.121 Fair apportionment also requires that a tax be both internally and
externally consistent.122 A tax is internally consistent if it is “structured so that if
every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result.”123
External consistency relates to “whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of
value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.”124
In Baltimore v. Priceline, the OTCs disputed the external consistency of
Baltimore City’s occupancy tax, arguing that, because the OTCs’ operations occur
entirely outside of the taxing locality, the services they provide are beyond that
which is “fairly attributable to the economic activity within” the taxing locality.125
The Court found this argument unconvincing and reasoned that “the full gross
payment for a hotel room, inclusive of any value attributable to rental facilitation, is
fairly attributable” to the taxing locality.126
Indeed, with regard to sales of goods in general, the Supreme Court has observed
that a “transaction itself does not readily reveal the extent to which completed or
anticipated interstate activity affects the value on which a buyer is taxed.”127 As such,
the Court has “held such taxes properly measurable by the gross charge for the
purchase, regardless of any activity outside the taxing jurisdiction that might have
preceded the sale . . . .”128 In Baltimore v. Priceline, the District Court applied this
logic to hotel room rentals, concluding that “the retail rental of a hotel room,
118. See infra Part V (addressing the possibility that the issues surrounding the “Amazon Tax” may prove
the catalyst which forces Congressional reconsideration of the physical presence requirement).
119. See Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *5.
120. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1989).
121. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180 (1983).
122. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 261.
123. Id.
124. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
125. See Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *5; Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
126. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *6 n.8.
127. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 186.
128. Id.
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whether facilitated online using interstate or international computer servers or in
person at the hotel reception desk, is most sensibly viewed as a discrete event
facilitated by the laws and amenities of the place of the hotel.”129 Thus, the total
payment made in the transaction would be fairly attributable to the taxing
locality.130
This seems compelling. The rental of a hotel room by a customer is the event
being taxed and the tax is imposed on the consumer, though the burden of
remitting the tax is transferred to whoever accepts payment for the room.131 It seems
in no way unreasonable that the tax be levied on the full amount paid by the
consumer, because without the police and fire protection provided by the locality,
as well as infrastructural support in the form of city streets, sewers, water, and
electricity, hotels would struggle to operate. Moreover, the payment made to an
OTC by a consumer is not divided into a room rental rate and a rental facilitation
rate.132 As such, the OTC’s contribution to the value of the room is not taxed
separately,133 greatly weakening the argument that, because their operations are
outside of the taxing locality, the tax is unfairly apportioned.
One could argue, however, that because the OTC remits to the hotel only part of
the fee it receives from the consumer, this gives a coherent basis for separating the
OTC’s contribution to the value of the room from the total amount paid by the
consumer. Indeed, it is not clear that the amount of value added by the OTCs need
be apparent to the customer in order for fair apportionment to be determined. It
would seem the province of the court to evaluate the value added by OTCs to the
process of hotel room rental and make the legal determination of fair
apportionment. However, as courts seem reluctant to divide the fees into amounts
earned by hotels and OTCs respectively, it seems the OTCs will have difficulty
carrying the burden of persuasion with regard to unfair apportionment.
c. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
The crux of the argument with regard to the discrimination against interstate
commerce prong of the Complete Auto test is that, while localities seek to collect

129. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *6.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part II.a.
132. See Melvin, supra note 20, at 47 (“When the customer books a hotel room reservation through the
OTC’s website, the OTC charges the customer an amount that is greater than the wholesale rate, referred to as
the “marked-up rate,” which represents the total amount paid by the consumer. The difference between the
marked-up rate and the wholesale rate is the OTC’s profit margin.” (citations omitted)).
133. In Baltimore v. Priceline, the District Court further noted that because OTC’s services are available on
the internet and the relative profits of the hotel and the OTC from an online transaction are not discoverable by
an online customer, the transaction “does not ‘readily reveal the extent to which [the] interstate activity affects
the value on which a buyer is taxed.’” Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *6 (quoting Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 186
(alterations in original)).
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occupancy taxes from OTCs, they fail to collect them from local “brick-andmortar” travel agencies.134 This argument rings very close to arguments based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment135 and is, if true, certainly
appealing on its face. To the extent that states are not collecting tax from local
agencies providing the same service as the OTCs, there would indeed seem to be an
inequity that both discriminates against interstate commerce and denies the OTCs
equal protection under the law.
However, evidence of this alleged discrimination seems to be elusive, perhaps as
a result of the general decline in the number of brick-and-mortar travel agencies.136
In Baltimore v. Priceline, for example, the parties argued over which party bears the
burden of proof that such discrimination either was or was not occurring, with
neither party providing any evidence one way or another and claiming it was the
other’s responsibility.137 The District Court sided with Baltimore, noting that the
party raising the constitutional challenge bears the burdens of production and
persuasion.138 Thus, unless OTCs are able to produce evidence of actual
discrimination in future cases, this argument must fail. In the meantime, localities
would be well advised to ensure they collect the tax from local travel agents if they
wish to collect the tax from OTCs.139
d. Fair Relation to Services Provided by State
The final prong of the Complete Auto test looks to whether a tax is overly
burdensome in relation to the benefits the taxed party receives from the taxing
locality.140 The OTCs contend that occupancy taxes imposed upon them are not in
fair relation to state or local services they received which, they argue, are very minor

134. See, e.g., Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *6.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. The number of travel agencies in the United States declined from around 34,000 in the mid-1990s to
around 13,000 in 2013. Rebecca L. Weber, The Travel Agent Is Dying, but It’s Not yet Dead, CNN (Oct. 10, 2013
5:20 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/03/travel/travel-agent-survival/; see also David Grossman, The EverChanging Role of the Travel Agent, USA TODAY (Jan. 24, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/columnist
/grossman/2007-06-22-travel-agents_N.htm (noting that in 2007, 20,000 accredited travel agents remained in
the United States). But see U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK: TRAVEL AGENTS (2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/travel-agents.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014) (placing the number of travel agents at 73,300 and predicting only a 12% decline in number of
travel agents over the next decade); Barack Obama Annoys Travel Agents by Suggesting They’re Obsolete,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 2011, 2:53PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/08/obama-and-travelagents.
137. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *8 n.13.
138. Id. (citation omitted); see also Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2008) (“When some form of
heightened scrutiny applies—as it does if a law’s own terms treat in-state and out-of-state producers
differently—then the burdens of production and persuasion rest on the state. But when challenging a law that
treats in-state and out-of-state entities identically, whoever wants to upset the law bears these burdens.”).
139. Failure to do so would also bolster arguments regarding violation of due process and equal protection.
140. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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given their lack of physical presence in the locality. In essence, the argument is that
OTCs cannot benefit from local fire or police protection, for example, while
working at their desks in another state.
This contention is easily rebutted. Without such services as cities and states
provide—fire protection, police protection, infrastructure—guests would be
unlikely to travel to, let alone stay overnight in, said cities or states. Thus, it could
be argued that without the state services, there would be no guests, and hotels
would not be viable as rental establishments. Without hotels, defendants’ business
would not exist, so the OTCs do benefit, albeit indirectly, from the services
provided by the state.
Courts have generally preferred a more direct approach in rejecting this
argument, however, focusing instead on the fact that the OTCs are not the parties
being taxed. As was succinctly stated in Baltimore v. Priceline, “[t]he tax is directly
related to the civil services provided by the City to the transient guest and thus any
benefits the OTC does or does not receive are immaterial with regard to this
inquiry.”141 In other words, because the hotel guest is the party being taxed, and the
hotel guest does benefit from the civil services provided by the locality, the tax bears
a fair relation to the services provided by the locality. Under either approach,
though, OTCs are unlikely to prevail with regard to the fair relation prong.

V. BROADER ISSUES OF STATE REGULATION
OF INTERNET COMMERCE
a. Abrogation of Quill Corp.’s Physical Presence Requirement
Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, OTCs must
prevail in occupancy tax cases where they lack a physical presence in the taxing
locality.142 However, the fact that the majority of the OTC cases are decided against
the OTCs, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, highlights a shift in the
landscape with regard to e-commerce and raises questions about the continuing
viability of the physical presence requirement.
The continuing rapid growth of internet commerce,143 which can be conducted
from nearly anywhere on earth, makes the physical presence requirement seem
141. Garbis Order, supra note 12, at *7 (emphasis added).
142. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1992) (reaffirming physical presence
requirement for a state tax to be constitutional as set forth in Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)); see also infra
Part III.b.
143. See, e.g., Justin Lahart, E-Commerce Surge May Hit Tax Revenue, WALL ST. J. (FEB. 17, 2011, 3:42 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/02/17/e-commerce-surge-hits-state-local-tax-revenue/; Betsy Morris,
More Consumers Prefer Online Shopping, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013, 10:27 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324063304578523112193480212; Thad Rueter, E-retail Spending to Increase 62% by
2016, INTERNETRETAILER (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://www.internetretailer.com/2012/02/27/e-retailspending-increase-45-2016.

Vol. 9, No. 2 2014

309

RANNIK.PP3.4EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2014 1:24 PM

Locality v. Online Travel Company
increasingly obsolete. However, the same argument was made in relation to mailorder business in 1992 when Quill Corp. was decided.144 While that decision predated the e-commerce boom, the growth of purchases through catalogues and mailorders was significant enough for many to question the wisdom of maintaining a
physical presence requirement.145 Nevertheless, the Court effectively reaffirmed the
Bellas Hess bright-line rule at that time, even if it intended it to be a temporary fix
while Congress considered whether to act.146
Is the explosion of interstate commerce over the internet, coupled with two
decades of Congressional inaction in this area, sufficient to force the Court to
explicitly reverse itself? While the estimated $23B of revenue states lose annually by
not taxing online sales147 might seem a strong incentive, recent legislative attempts
to overrule Quill Corp. may stay the Court’s hand.148 Indeed, the Supreme Court
recently declined to review a New York sales tax law applicable to online
purchases,149 perhaps indicating the Court’s continuing deference to Congress on
the issue of state taxation of e-commerce.
b. The “Amazon Tax” and the Changing Landscape of Retail Sales
In 2011, the “Main Street Fairness Act” was introduced in both houses of
Congress.150 The Act, which expired without being enacted, would have overruled
the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. and would have allowed states to
collect sales taxes on out-of-state internet sales.151 This was far from the first piece of
legislation to affect a tax on online sales. In addition to several bills in the United
States Congress,152 a number of states have passed legislation seeking to collect tax
from internet retailers who make above a specified amount of money through

144. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 303 (referencing the N.D. Supreme Court’s observation that mail-order
business had grown “from a relatively inconsequential market niche” to a “goliath” between 1967 and 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 311; see also Todd S. Snyder, Ending the Internet Tax Moratorium, 60 J. MO. B. 66, 68 (2004) (“The
removal of the Due Process Clause as a roadblock opened a door for Congress, under its commerce powers, to
legislatively empower the states to require the collection of these taxes. The Supreme Court in Quill specifically
invited Congress to act in this area . . . .”).
147. See Ezra Klein, The Long Shadow of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, WASH. POST (July 9, 2012, 6:51 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/09/the-long-shadow-of-quill-corp-v-northdakota/.
148. See infra Part V.b.
149. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013), cert denied, 134 S.
Ct. 682, 682 (2013).
150. H.R. 2701, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1452, 112th Cong. (2011).
151. See H.R. 2701; S. 1452.
152. See Matt Schaefer, Bill Introduced in Congress to Override Quill in Favor of Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement, EYES ON ECOM LAW (Aug. 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://eyesonecomlaw.blogspot.com/2011/08/
bills-introduced-in-congress-to.html (noting the introduction of similar bills in 2003, 2006, 2007, and 2010).
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affiliates in the state, called an “affiliate tax” or “Amazon tax.”153 Given that
subjecting online retailers to state tax would eliminate one of the primary
advantages they currently enjoy, it is no surprise that major online retailers such as
Amazon and eBay worked hard to oppose such measures.154
The “Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013” is another, more comprehensive piece of
legislation aimed at establishing a mechanism for taxing online sales.155 Passed by
the Senate in May 2013, the act authorizes the states that have adopted the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement156 to collect sales and use tax from remote
sellers that have annual gross receipts of over $1 million.157 In exchange, these states
must take specific measures to simplify the calculation of their sales and use taxes in
order to make it feasible for companies to comply with each state’s tax scheme.158
Moreover, states must provide software to remote sellers that will calculate the sales
and use taxes due on each transaction, so that smaller sellers are not prohibitively
disadvantaged compared to larger sellers with the resources to do this for
themselves.159

153. See Michael R. Gordon, Up the Amazon Without a Paddle: Examining Sales Tax, Entity Isolation, and the
“Affiliate Tax”, 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 299, 318 (2010) (noting that “the ‘affiliate tax’ or ‘Amazon tax’ is truly not
a tax but is instead a constitutional way to collect taxes that are already owed”). More specifically, “states are
creating legislation, commonly, but inaccurately, called an ‘affiliate tax,’ which provides that if a company
makes a certain amount of money through an affiliate’s presence in the state, it is deemed to have legal physical
presence and is required to collect sales taxes.” Id. at 299.
154. Amazon has spent significant amounts in past years lobbying Congress not to enact such a tax, see
Amazon Spends $480,000 Lobbying Government in 3Q, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:42 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9KHJVV01.htm, as well as ceasing affiliate activities in states
which have passed the affiliate tax. See Jessica Fender, Amazon Fires Colorado Affiliates in Protest, DENVER POST
(Mar. 8, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/ thespot/2010/03/08/amazon-fires-colorado-affiliates-inprotest/6554/.
155. Marketplace Fairness Act, H.R. 684, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013).
156. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement is a cooperative effort between 44 states “to simplify
sales and use tax collection and administration by retailers and states” in an attempt to encourage internet
sellers to collect tax on sales to customers in member states. What is the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement?, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?
page=gen_1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). As of January 1, 2014, 24 states had become either full or associate
members of the Agreement. Streamline State Status 01-01-2014, http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/
images/state%20map% 202014_1_1.jpg (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
157. See H.R. 684, S. 743 § 2(c) (establishing the “Small Seller Exception”).
158. H.R. 684, S. 743 § 2(b)(2). Sales and use taxes vary enormously from locality to locality, often in utterly
counter-intuitive ways. In some states, an item that might otherwise be taxed as candy will be taxed as food if it
contains wheat, meaning a Snickers bar would be taxable one way and a Kit-Kat bar another. JAMES
GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 82 (3d ed. 2013).
159. H.R. 684, S. 743 § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii).
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Perhaps counter-intuitively, Amazon has offered its support for such measures
in recent months,160 presumably counting on its growing nationwide infrastructure,
wide range of products, and planned same-day delivery161 to keep its advantage over
online competitors. While it might seem odd that Amazon would wish to
disadvantage itself thus, the company is either bowing to the inevitable162 or is
making a very shrewd move. In the latter case, Amazon can likely assume that being
able to offer lower prices on a greater selection of merchandise at greater
convenience to the customer will allow it to maintain its advantage over traditional
brick-and-mortar retailers, even if it must pay local sales and use taxes. But, if other
online retailers face increased competition from these brick-and-mortar retailers
due to the imposition of sales and use taxes, it would seem Amazon could
substantially extend its advantage over online retailers and brick-and-mortar
retailers alike.163 Wal-Mart and eBay seem to agree, given that both are also
experimenting with same-day delivery service.164
Of course, if the Marketplace Fairness Act passes into law and overrules Quill
Corp., there will be little to prevent OTCs from being subject to state and local
occupancy taxes.165 It is possible that the test for the constitutionality of state
taxation of an out-of-state entity will revert to the Complete Auto test, which makes

160. See Catherine Dodge, Amazon Parts with eBay to Lobby for Streamlined Online Sales Tax, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 16, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-16/amazon-parts-with-ebay-to-lobbyfor-streamlined-online-sales-tax.html. Amazon has entered agreements to collect sales tax on its internet sales
with several states, including New Jersey, Virginia, South Carolina, and California. See Robert Wood,
Widespread Amazon and Internet Taxes Coming Soon, FORBES (June 17, 2012, 11:39 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/17/widespread-amazon-and-internet-taxes-coming-soon/;
Farhad Manjoo, I Want it Today: How Amazon’s Ambitious New Push for Same-Day Delivery Will Destroy Local
Retail, SLATE (July 11, 2012, 5:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2012/07/
amazon_same_ day_delivery_how_the_e_commerce_giant_will_destroy_local_retail_.html.
With other states, Amazon has agreed to future payment of sales taxes on internet sales, but has
requested payment be deferred while it sets up distribution facilities in those states, promising the addition of
thousands of jobs to the state economy in exchange for the deferral. See David Slade, Amazon Tax Bills Come
Due, POST & COURIER (updated Mar. 23, 2012, 6:27 PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120128/
PC05/301289934 (“Amazon’s exemption from collecting the South Carolina tax on sales was tied to the
company’s promise to invest in the state and create jobs, which the company did when its Lexington County
distribution center opened last fall.”).
161. See, e.g., Manjoo, supra note 160; Jessica Stillman, Amazon Takes on Same-Day Delivery: How Can
Small Businesses Compete?, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2012, 1:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/ups/2012/12/05/
amazon-takes-on-same-day-delivery-how-can-small-businesses-compete/.
162. See generally David H. Gershel, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable Application of Sales Tax to
Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 335 (2011).
163. Manjoo, supra note 160 (“It’s hard to overstate how thoroughly [Amazon’s] move will shake up the
retail industry. Same-day delivery has long been the holy grail of Internet retailers . . . . If it can pull that off, the
company will permanently alter how we shop. To put it more bluntly: Physical retailers will be hosed.”).
164. Stillman, supra note 161; Anne D’Innocenzio, Wal-Mart Tests Same Day Delivery for Holidays, USA
TODAY (Oct. 9, 2012, 7:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/ 10/09/walmart-sameday-delivery/1622867/.
165. See, e.g., supra Part IV.
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no explicit mention of a physical presence requirement.166 And, based on the
Court’s reasoning in Baltimore v. Priceline, local occupancy taxes will likely pass the
Complete Auto test and be imposed on OTCs.167
But even if some such act does not pass, OTCs and other online businesses will
still likely find themselves subject to state sales and use taxes. Numerous states are
passing laws that will require that consumers pay sales tax on internet purchases.168
One way or another, then, the physical presence dam is set to burst, either as a
result of Congressional action overruling Quill Corp., or of the Supreme Court
overruling Quill Corp. itself.

VI. CONCLUSION
State taxation of internet sales and services by out-of-state entities is coming.169
However, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill Corp., the imposition of sales
& use taxes on internet retailers with no physical presence in the taxing state
remains unconstitutional because it violates the Commerce Clause.170 The
substantial revenue that states are losing by not being able to tax online sales and
services by out-of-state entities171 and the mounting number and types of challenges
to the requirement172 suggest that Quill Corp. must soon be overruled, either by the
Supreme Court itself or by Congressional legislation.173
Of course, the overruling of Quill Corp. would have a significant import to OTC
litigation regarding local occupancy tax. If the physical presence requirement for
state taxation is abrogated, the relevant test for whether a state tax is constitutional
would seem to be the Complete Auto test, which requires only that there be a
“substantial nexus” between the taxing locality and the taxed entity.174 Under this
test, based on the District Court’s opinion in Baltimore v. Priceline,175 OTCs would
likely be subject to local occupancy taxes.176

166. The test instead requires only a “substantial nexus” between the taxing locality and the taxed entity. See
supra Part III.b.
167. See supra Part IV.
168. See Klein, supra note 147 (citing Amrita Jayakumar, States, Congress Rallying for an E-Sales Tax, WASH.
POST (July 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/states-congress-rallying-for-an-e-salestax/2012/07/08/gJQACKtpWW_story.html. But see Performance Mktg. Ass’n v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54, 59–60
(Ill. 2013) (striking down the Illinois law requiring online retailers to collect and remit state sales tax).
169. See generally Gershel, supra note 162.
170. See supra Part III.b.
171. Estimates put the amount of tax revenue lost by States at around $23B. See Klein, supra note 147.
172. Namely, the increasing number of OTC cases and the imminence of taxation of online sales. See supra
Part V.b.
173. See supra Part V.b.
174. See supra Part III.a.
175. Garbis Order, supra note 12.
176. See supra Part IV.
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In short, the bell will soon toll for Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. The Supreme
Court seems unlikely to overrule the case itself, given that interstate commerce is
for Congress to regulate and evidenced by its recent denial of cert in Amazon.com v.
N.Y. Dep’t of Taxation & Finance.177 The question, then, is how long it will take
Congress to pass a measure allowing state taxation of e-commerce. Given the
increase in legislation to that effect among states and in Congress,178 it seems a good
bet that OTCs will not escape paying local occupancy taxes for very much longer.

177.
178.
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134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
See supra Part V.b.
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